Quantitative analysis of the monopoly index and efficiency of three industries of public service was carried out with SCP model, and the questions that why the government does not monopolize the public service market and whether private departments can provide efficient public service were answered. Moreover, social welfare function of two classes was established, which provides theoretical support for PPP model from the demand side. Efficiency source of P1 + P2 was analyzed with Nash equilibrium and economics of scope, and it was concluded that the ultimate of PPP isa kind of Nash equilibrium.
| Published in | Social Sciences (Volume 7, Issue 3) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15 |
| Page(s) | 141-145 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2018. Published by Science Publishing Group |
ISCP Model, Nash Equilibrium, Economics of Scope, Social Welfare Function
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APA Style
Xianmei Xu, Ke Gao. (2018). The Research of PPP Model Under Better Service Framework. Social Sciences, 7(3), 141-145. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15
ACS Style
Xianmei Xu; Ke Gao. The Research of PPP Model Under Better Service Framework. Soc. Sci. 2018, 7(3), 141-145. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15
AMA Style
Xianmei Xu, Ke Gao. The Research of PPP Model Under Better Service Framework. Soc Sci. 2018;7(3):141-145. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15,
author = {Xianmei Xu and Ke Gao},
title = {The Research of PPP Model Under Better Service Framework},
journal = {Social Sciences},
volume = {7},
number = {3},
pages = {141-145},
doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20180703.15},
abstract = {Quantitative analysis of the monopoly index and efficiency of three industries of public service was carried out with SCP model, and the questions that why the government does not monopolize the public service market and whether private departments can provide efficient public service were answered. Moreover, social welfare function of two classes was established, which provides theoretical support for PPP model from the demand side. Efficiency source of P1 + P2 was analyzed with Nash equilibrium and economics of scope, and it was concluded that the ultimate of PPP isa kind of Nash equilibrium.},
year = {2018}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - The Research of PPP Model Under Better Service Framework AU - Xianmei Xu AU - Ke Gao Y1 - 2018/06/20 PY - 2018 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15 DO - 10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15 T2 - Social Sciences JF - Social Sciences JO - Social Sciences SP - 141 EP - 145 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2326-988X UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15 AB - Quantitative analysis of the monopoly index and efficiency of three industries of public service was carried out with SCP model, and the questions that why the government does not monopolize the public service market and whether private departments can provide efficient public service were answered. Moreover, social welfare function of two classes was established, which provides theoretical support for PPP model from the demand side. Efficiency source of P1 + P2 was analyzed with Nash equilibrium and economics of scope, and it was concluded that the ultimate of PPP isa kind of Nash equilibrium. VL - 7 IS - 3 ER -
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