Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States

Phil W. Reynolds

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17

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Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States

Phil W. Reynolds

Published in Social Sciences (Volume 7, Issue 1)

Received: 21 November 2017 Accepted: 4 December 2017 Published: 2 January 2018

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Abstract

Great powers overextend their security apparatus attempting to maintain an international system from which they benefit. Costly expenditures of internally mobilized hard power in irregular wars increases the the decline of relative power while externally mobilized power in the form of partisans may delay or defeat power transition. This paper examines the U. S. war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan in order to determine if long periods of irregular war had an effect on those state’s relative position in the internaitonal system. This paper will demonstrate that those wars eroded each position without the large, structural war predicted by normative IR theory.

Published in	Social Sciences (Volume 7, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17
Page(s)	43-54
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2018. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Internal Mobilization, External Mobilization, Power Transition, Irregular War, Dominant States

References

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Phil W. Reynolds. (2018). Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States. Social Sciences, 7(1), 43-54. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17

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Phil W. Reynolds. Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States. Soc. Sci. 2018, 7(1), 43-54. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17

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Phil W. Reynolds. Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States. Soc Sci. 2018;7(1):43-54. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17

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@article{10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17,
  author = {Phil W. Reynolds},
  title = {Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States},
  journal = {Social Sciences},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {43-54},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20180701.17},
  abstract = {Great powers overextend their security apparatus attempting to maintain an international system from which they benefit. Costly expenditures of internally mobilized hard power in irregular wars increases the the decline of relative power while externally mobilized power in the form of partisans may delay or defeat power transition. This paper examines the U. S. war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan in order to determine if long periods of irregular war had an effect on those state’s relative position in the internaitonal system. This paper will demonstrate that those wars eroded each position without the large, structural war predicted by normative IR theory.},
 year = {2018}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States
AU  - Phil W. Reynolds
Y1  - 2018/01/02
PY  - 2018
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17
DO  - 10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17
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AB  - Great powers overextend their security apparatus attempting to maintain an international system from which they benefit. Costly expenditures of internally mobilized hard power in irregular wars increases the the decline of relative power while externally mobilized power in the form of partisans may delay or defeat power transition. This paper examines the U. S. war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan in order to determine if long periods of irregular war had an effect on those state’s relative position in the internaitonal system. This paper will demonstrate that those wars eroded each position without the large, structural war predicted by normative IR theory.
VL  - 7
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Author Information

Phil W. Reynolds

Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii-Manoa, Honolulu, USA

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Phil W. Reynolds. (2018). Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States. Social Sciences, 7(1), 43-54. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17

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Phil W. Reynolds. Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States. Soc. Sci. 2018, 7(1), 43-54. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17

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Phil W. Reynolds. Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States. Soc Sci. 2018;7(1):43-54. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17

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@article{10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17,
  author = {Phil W. Reynolds},
  title = {Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States},
  journal = {Social Sciences},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {43-54},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20180701.17},
  abstract = {Great powers overextend their security apparatus attempting to maintain an international system from which they benefit. Costly expenditures of internally mobilized hard power in irregular wars increases the the decline of relative power while externally mobilized power in the form of partisans may delay or defeat power transition. This paper examines the U. S. war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan in order to determine if long periods of irregular war had an effect on those state’s relative position in the internaitonal system. This paper will demonstrate that those wars eroded each position without the large, structural war predicted by normative IR theory.},
 year = {2018}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Long Wars: Demonstrating the Corrosive Effects of Irregular Wars on Dominant States
AU  - Phil W. Reynolds
Y1  - 2018/01/02
PY  - 2018
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17
DO  - 10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17
T2  - Social Sciences
JF  - Social Sciences
JO  - Social Sciences
SP  - 43
EP  - 54
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-988X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20180701.17
AB  - Great powers overextend their security apparatus attempting to maintain an international system from which they benefit. Costly expenditures of internally mobilized hard power in irregular wars increases the the decline of relative power while externally mobilized power in the form of partisans may delay or defeat power transition. This paper examines the U. S. war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan in order to determine if long periods of irregular war had an effect on those state’s relative position in the internaitonal system. This paper will demonstrate that those wars eroded each position without the large, structural war predicted by normative IR theory.
VL  - 7
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download