Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions

Guoshun Ma; Chonghui Ma

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions

Guoshun Ma, Chonghui Ma

Published in Journal of World Economic Research (Volume 9, Issue 1)

Received: 9 January 2020 Accepted: 31 January 2020 Published: 10 February 2020

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Abstract

Since the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued relevant policies on standardizing the credit card business of college students in 2009, college students' credit cards have gradually withdrawn from campus loan business. In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, "Online campus loan" began to take the college student market as the goal, and quickly entered the university campus through recruiting student cadres to carry out "carpet" promotion activities inside the campus. And seized the current situation of college students' lack of financial knowledge and the psychology of comparative consumption, the business volume expands rapidly. The subsequent malignant events, such as "10g naked loan slip", "huge profits and fund-raising", "some college students jumping off buildings to commit suicide due to their inability to repay the loan", also have a negative impact on the society. In view of the above phenomena, this article combines existing research on existing problems of campus loans, and establishes an evolutionary game model between the campus online loan platform and college student borrowers from the perspective of evolutionary games. The game model has two stable points (1, 1), (0, 0), namely, the campus loan platform chooses to deceive the borrower, the borrower chooses to break the trust, and the campus loan platform chooses not to deceive the borrower, and the borrower keeps the trust. This paper discusses the influence of the changes of the relevant parameters in the model on the choice of the game strategy, and puts forward some suggestions to establish a two-way scoring mechanism for online lending, increase the financial knowledge reserve and income of college students, and help them establish a correct consumption view to standardize the campus online lending work.

Published in	Journal of World Economic Research (Volume 9, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18
Page(s)	51-57
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Campus Online Loan, Evolutionary Game, Replication Dynamic Equation, Evolutionary Stability Strategy

References

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[2]	Anning Zhang, Xin Gu, Cheng Yang. Analysis on the risk factors of P2P campus loan default [J]. Journal of Finance and accounting, 2018 (06): 82-89.
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[5]	Congcong Jiao, Yuqing Jiao, can Li, Xiaoguang Wu, Le Zhang i. The development status and Countermeasures of College Students' Campus loans [J]. China business theory, 2019 (05): 44-46.
[6]	Xiong Xiong, Weina Zhang. Research on P2P platform regulatory mechanism based on evolutionary game theory [J]. Economic Research Guide, 2018 (36): 128-129 + 145.
[7]	Mingjie Rong, Hualin Liu, Guoxin Li, Kaifan Chen, Jiacheng Liu, Jinyun Liu. Current situation analysis and countermeasure research on campus loan [J]. Modern economic information, 2018 (10): 318.
[8]	Zhenglu Han. Game Analysis of P2P network lending behavior [J]. Cooperative economy and technology, 2019 (05): 64-66.
[9]	Shuting Ju, Fanyu Liu, Zhongxia Li. Survey on online loan consumption and financial literacy of college students [J]. Cooperative economy and technology, 2019 (08): 47-49.
[10]	Chunmei Zheng, Shanshan Jia. Mechanism design of standardized development of campus loan platform in China from the perspective of game [J]. Foreign trade and economic cooperation, 2016 (09): 120-122 + 132.
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[12]	Yan Wang. Why does the campus loan become a "campus disaster"? [N]. democracy and the rule of law times, October 14, 2018 (007).
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[15]	Kairong Su, Yujie Cui. Analysis of P2P online loan mode selection and supervision based on evolutionary game theory [J]. Market modernization, 2015 (15): 74-76.
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[17]	Weibull J W. Evolutionary game theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998, 32-48.
[18]	Friedman D. Evolutionary games in economics. Econometric, 1991, (3): 637-666. Fund Project: National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.: 71761031).

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Guoshun Ma, Chonghui Ma. (2020). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions. Journal of World Economic Research, 9(1), 51-57. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18

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ACS Style

Guoshun Ma; Chonghui Ma. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions. J. World Econ. Res. 2020, 9(1), 51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18

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AMA Style

Guoshun Ma, Chonghui Ma. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions. J World Econ Res. 2020;9(1):51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18

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@article{10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18,
  author = {Guoshun Ma and Chonghui Ma},
  title = {Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions},
  journal = {Journal of World Economic Research},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {51-57},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jwer.20200901.18},
  abstract = {Since the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued relevant policies on standardizing the credit card business of college students in 2009, college students' credit cards have gradually withdrawn from campus loan business. In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, "Online campus loan" began to take the college student market as the goal, and quickly entered the university campus through recruiting student cadres to carry out "carpet" promotion activities inside the campus. And seized the current situation of college students' lack of financial knowledge and the psychology of comparative consumption, the business volume expands rapidly. The subsequent malignant events, such as "10g naked loan slip", "huge profits and fund-raising", "some college students jumping off buildings to commit suicide due to their inability to repay the loan", also have a negative impact on the society. In view of the above phenomena, this article combines existing research on existing problems of campus loans, and establishes an evolutionary game model between the campus online loan platform and college student borrowers from the perspective of evolutionary games. The game model has two stable points (1, 1), (0, 0), namely, the campus loan platform chooses to deceive the borrower, the borrower chooses to break the trust, and the campus loan platform chooses not to deceive the borrower, and the borrower keeps the trust. This paper discusses the influence of the changes of the relevant parameters in the model on the choice of the game strategy, and puts forward some suggestions to establish a two-way scoring mechanism for online lending, increase the financial knowledge reserve and income of college students, and help them establish a correct consumption view to standardize the campus online lending work.},
 year = {2020}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions
AU  - Guoshun Ma
AU  - Chonghui Ma
Y1  - 2020/02/10
PY  - 2020
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18
DO  - 10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18
T2  - Journal of World Economic Research
JF  - Journal of World Economic Research
JO  - Journal of World Economic Research
SP  - 51
EP  - 57
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-7748
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18
AB  - Since the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued relevant policies on standardizing the credit card business of college students in 2009, college students' credit cards have gradually withdrawn from campus loan business. In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, "Online campus loan" began to take the college student market as the goal, and quickly entered the university campus through recruiting student cadres to carry out "carpet" promotion activities inside the campus. And seized the current situation of college students' lack of financial knowledge and the psychology of comparative consumption, the business volume expands rapidly. The subsequent malignant events, such as "10g naked loan slip", "huge profits and fund-raising", "some college students jumping off buildings to commit suicide due to their inability to repay the loan", also have a negative impact on the society. In view of the above phenomena, this article combines existing research on existing problems of campus loans, and establishes an evolutionary game model between the campus online loan platform and college student borrowers from the perspective of evolutionary games. The game model has two stable points (1, 1), (0, 0), namely, the campus loan platform chooses to deceive the borrower, the borrower chooses to break the trust, and the campus loan platform chooses not to deceive the borrower, and the borrower keeps the trust. This paper discusses the influence of the changes of the relevant parameters in the model on the choice of the game strategy, and puts forward some suggestions to establish a two-way scoring mechanism for online lending, increase the financial knowledge reserve and income of college students, and help them establish a correct consumption view to standardize the campus online lending work.
VL  - 9
IS  - 1
ER  -

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Author Information

Guoshun Ma

College of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwest Normal University, Lanzhou, China
Chonghui Ma

College of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwest Normal University, Lanzhou, China

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Guoshun Ma, Chonghui Ma. (2020). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions. Journal of World Economic Research, 9(1), 51-57. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18

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ACS Style

Guoshun Ma; Chonghui Ma. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions. J. World Econ. Res. 2020, 9(1), 51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18

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AMA Style

Guoshun Ma, Chonghui Ma. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions. J World Econ Res. 2020;9(1):51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18,
  author = {Guoshun Ma and Chonghui Ma},
  title = {Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions},
  journal = {Journal of World Economic Research},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {51-57},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jwer.20200901.18},
  abstract = {Since the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued relevant policies on standardizing the credit card business of college students in 2009, college students' credit cards have gradually withdrawn from campus loan business. In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, "Online campus loan" began to take the college student market as the goal, and quickly entered the university campus through recruiting student cadres to carry out "carpet" promotion activities inside the campus. And seized the current situation of college students' lack of financial knowledge and the psychology of comparative consumption, the business volume expands rapidly. The subsequent malignant events, such as "10g naked loan slip", "huge profits and fund-raising", "some college students jumping off buildings to commit suicide due to their inability to repay the loan", also have a negative impact on the society. In view of the above phenomena, this article combines existing research on existing problems of campus loans, and establishes an evolutionary game model between the campus online loan platform and college student borrowers from the perspective of evolutionary games. The game model has two stable points (1, 1), (0, 0), namely, the campus loan platform chooses to deceive the borrower, the borrower chooses to break the trust, and the campus loan platform chooses not to deceive the borrower, and the borrower keeps the trust. This paper discusses the influence of the changes of the relevant parameters in the model on the choice of the game strategy, and puts forward some suggestions to establish a two-way scoring mechanism for online lending, increase the financial knowledge reserve and income of college students, and help them establish a correct consumption view to standardize the campus online lending work.},
 year = {2020}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions
AU  - Guoshun Ma
AU  - Chonghui Ma
Y1  - 2020/02/10
PY  - 2020
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18
DO  - 10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18
T2  - Journal of World Economic Research
JF  - Journal of World Economic Research
JO  - Journal of World Economic Research
SP  - 51
EP  - 57
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-7748
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18
AB  - Since the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued relevant policies on standardizing the credit card business of college students in 2009, college students' credit cards have gradually withdrawn from campus loan business. In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, "Online campus loan" began to take the college student market as the goal, and quickly entered the university campus through recruiting student cadres to carry out "carpet" promotion activities inside the campus. And seized the current situation of college students' lack of financial knowledge and the psychology of comparative consumption, the business volume expands rapidly. The subsequent malignant events, such as "10g naked loan slip", "huge profits and fund-raising", "some college students jumping off buildings to commit suicide due to their inability to repay the loan", also have a negative impact on the society. In view of the above phenomena, this article combines existing research on existing problems of campus loans, and establishes an evolutionary game model between the campus online loan platform and college student borrowers from the perspective of evolutionary games. The game model has two stable points (1, 1), (0, 0), namely, the campus loan platform chooses to deceive the borrower, the borrower chooses to break the trust, and the campus loan platform chooses not to deceive the borrower, and the borrower keeps the trust. This paper discusses the influence of the changes of the relevant parameters in the model on the choice of the game strategy, and puts forward some suggestions to establish a two-way scoring mechanism for online lending, increase the financial knowledge reserve and income of college students, and help them establish a correct consumption view to standardize the campus online lending work.
VL  - 9
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download